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ARE BACKBENCHERS FIGHTING BACK? INTRA-PARTY CONTESTATION IN 
GERMAN PARLIAMENT DEBATES ON THE GREEK CRISIS 
 
Over the course of the Eurozone crisis, we have witnessed a disintegration of the 
pro-European consensus in the German Bundestag. This study focuses on patterns 
of intra-party contestation by examining individual-level determinants of the 
growing party disunity. Party leaders constrain the room of manoeuvre of 
individual legislators, but the degree of party control they face varies depending 
on their position within the party, and we expect this to be reflected in their 
behaviour. Our comprehensive case study of plenary debates on the Greek crisis 
in the Bundestag (2010–2015) analyses legislative speech, voting defection and 
explanations of vote. Our results show that an MP’s rank, experience, electoral 
mandate and gender matter in their inclination to voice dissent. Here, the 
frontbencher–backbencher categorisation shows the most consistent effect. 
Keywords: euro crisis; Germany; legislative behaviour; party unity; politicisation 
 
Studies on the Europeanisation of national parliaments and the domestic politicisation of 
European Union (EU) issues tend to focus on member-state legislatures as collective actors, 
failing to draw on the key insights from the literature on legislative parties, which are not 
unitary actors either. This article attempts to make this link by combining a party perspective 
with an individual-level approach in order to enhance our understanding of the actors and 
inner workings that drive or impede the parliamentarisation of EU politics. According to 
Raunio and Hix (2000, p. 163), the processes whereby national parliaments claim back 
control from executive actors by redressing the information asymmetry and introducing 
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scrutiny instruments is driven by ‘the desire by non-governing parties and backbench 
parliamentarians’. In this article, we test whether backbenchers have indeed learned to fight 
back. More precisely, we empirically investigate the recent disintegration of the pro-
European consensus in the German lower house, the Bundestag, and we ask to what extent 
this can be explained by dissent within rather than between parties by looking at both party-
level and individual-level determinants. 
The Eurozone crisis provides an exemplary case for testing whether it is no longer 
merely executive actors and a small number of frontbenchers and ‘Euro-wizards’ who take 
charge of EU debates. The crisis has shifted EU decision-making to the forefront of public 
debate and protest. This is even the case in Germany, where traditionally public support for 
European integration has been strong and where the Bundestag has been characterised by a 
solid pro-EU cross-partisan consensus. Germany can be regarded as a ‘high barrier system’ 
where challenger parties do not emerge easily (Hooghe and Marks, 2017); and after the 
Eurosceptic Alternative for Germany narrowly missed entering the Bundestag in 2013, 
contestation intensified and cracks widened particularly among the Christian Democrats. 
Narrowing down on the Greek debt crisis allows us to examine patterns of intra-party 
contestation for one specific issue that has become increasingly controversial between 2010 
and 2015. 
Our analysis of roll-call votes (RCVs) suggests that voting unity only tells us part of the 
story because some parties enforce discipline more strictly than others and the incentive to 
toe the party line varies between different categories of members of parliament (MPs). 
Therefore, we also examine which MPs give plenary speeches and deliver explanations of 
vote (EoVs). In the Bundestag party leaders tightly control access to the plenary floor, which 
means that plenary debates may project disproportionate party cohesion, as backbenchers and 
dissenting MPs are unlikely to receive speaking time. But any MP can deliver an EoV to 
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provide justification for her voting decision and/or voice reservations. These written 
statements are signed by one or more MPs, annexed to the official minutes and often 
published on MPs’ personal websites. EoVs are therefore a very useful additional data source 
for the study of party cohesion. 
Our comprehensive approach addresses some of the limitations faced by studies that 
focus solely on voting behaviour, primarily because we shift the focus from preferences to 
the incentive and opportunity structures of legislators and look at individual-level behaviour 
in the context of institutional constraints. Our analysis confirms the significance of party 
control in setting the room of manoeuvre for individual MPs and thereby determining levels 
of observed party unity. We test how an MP’s electoral mandate, length of membership and 
rank affect her legislative behaviour in terms of raising dissent. While we find some evidence 
that mandate, experience as well as gender matter, the distinction between frontbenchers and 
backbenchers shows the most consistent effect. Another key finding is that EoVs provide a 
meaningful channel of expression for MPs with limited influence. The act of giving an EoV 
may not be considered a serious challenge to party unity due to its limited public visibility, 
but we observe a sequential relationship between EoVs and future voting defection. 
 
1. EU politicisation in national parliaments and party (dis)unity: The case of the 
German Bundestag 
The literature on the role of national parliaments in the EU has shifted from measuring and 
ranking their legislative scrutiny and oversight capabilities, i.e. government-related function, 
to their communicative activities, i.e. citizen-related function, and correspondingly the 
concept of politicisation has increasingly featured in these studies (e.g. Miklin, 2014; Rauh, 
2015; Wendler, 2016) to enhance our understanding of the conditions, mechanisms and 
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actors that drive parliamentary contention of EU issues. In line with de Wilde’s (2011, pp. 
566–567) conceptualisation of politicisation as ‘an increase in polarization of opinions, 
interests or values and the extent to which they are publicly advanced towards policy 
formulation within the EU’, we also emphasise controversiality and public visibility when 
defining politicisation as the making visible of conflicting alternatives. The contentious 
nature of EU issues needs to not only be detected by parliamentary actors but also 
communicated to the public. For national parliaments to communicate divergent views on EU 
matters, it seems crucial that a diverse range of parliamentary actors is involved. Thus, this 
study shifts the focus from the collective level to the level of legislative parties and individual 
legislators. 
Empirical research has shown that mainstream political parties are more pro-European 
than their voters (Mattila and Raunio, 2012) and collectively offer voters little choice with 
respect to EU integration (van der Eijk and Franklin, 2004). Internally, however, they more 
divided over EU politics than over economic left/right and social libertarian/authoritarian 
issues (Edwards, 2009; Hooghe and Marks, 2017). Cleavage theory suggests that 
conservative parties with a centrist position on European integration are particularly 
susceptible to internal dissent because they support economic integration while 
simultaneously defending national sovereignty against further political integration and the 
nation state against the socio-cultural effects of transnationalism (Marks and Wilson, 2000; 
Edwards, 2009). Assuming that party leaderships have a strong incentive – and means at 
disposal – to maintain a coherent party label, this begs the question to what extent and how 
the lack of party unity over EU politics manifests itself in legislative behaviour. 
As Germany is the largest creditor country (contributing around 27% to the euro crisis 
measures), the Bundestag’s budget sovereignty was at stake, and public opinion was highly 
sceptical about offering transnational solidarity in the form of financial assistance. The events 
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around the euro crisis presented German MPs with an unprecedented stimulus to demand 
involvement and voice their views, even if these may contradict party line. The Bundestag is 
a comparatively strong chamber in terms of its institutional powers but should be considered 
an unlikely case for politicisation. It is typically described as a ‘working parliament’ with a 
strong focus on legislative scrutiny in the standing committees rather than heated debates in 
the plenum. Despite strong opposition rights and a moderately strong EU scrutiny system, 
contestation of EU affairs is generally limited due to a solid pro-European consensus among 
the major parties (Auel and Raunio, 2014). As Kröger and Bellamy (2016, p. 145) note, ‘EU 
issues have been most debated in [national parliaments] where consensus is greatest rather 
than where it is weakest [and] Germany in particular fits this pattern’. 
 
2. Theorising party (dis)unity and legislative behaviour 
When shifting the focus to MPs’ incentives and opportunities to voice discontent with the 
party line on EU issues, we need to gain a comprehensive understanding of the type of 
legislators who are willing and in a position to invest resources and express their opinion in 
EU debates, while taking into account the role of legislative parties in constraining their room 
of manoeuvre. Legislative parties are internally divided, deeply hierarchical organisations, in 
which the leadership feels the responsibility to maintain unity and possesses a significant 
amount of resources, disciplinary instruments and rewards to do so (Bailer, 2017). 
Conceptually, we can make a distinction between party cohesion and party discipline, that is, 
between substantive agreement based on shared preferences, on the one hand, and 
cooperation under compulsion and anticipated sanctions, on the other hand (Hazan, 2014). 
Empirically, however, we face an observability problem, since the ‘black box’ of legislative 
parties makes it challenging to determine the impact of party control on legislative behaviour. 
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[Insert Figure 1 here] 
Following Proksch and Slapin’s (2015a) theory, the level of latent intra-party disagreement 
determines which action MPs choose, i.e. the observable party disunity: While ‘defecting 
from one’s party leadership on a vote, especially on one that is both high profile and 
whipped, constitutes the ultimate act of defiance’ (ibid., p. 26), voting defection is not the 
only way parties display disunity. In theory, EoVs and speeches offer outlets for lesser 
disagreement. Once we take into account contextual factors, in particular established 
practices of party control (see Figure 1), we would, however, expect plenary debates to show 
the lowest level of intra-party disunity. Plenary debates are highly visible to the public, more 
so than RCVs, and in the case of the Bundestag party leaders have formal control of the 
plenary floor by deciding who gets to speak on behalf of the parliamentary party group and 
for how long. Proksch and Slapin (2015b) find that in highly salient debates, German party 
leaders are more likely to speak themselves and MPs who are ideologically distant from the 
party leadership tend to give fewer speeches (whereas the opposite is the case in the House of 
Commons). Bailer (2017, p. 7) quotes a party group leader in the Bundestag: ‘Of course, you 
are only allowed to talk in the morning when Phoenix [public TV news channel] is reporting 
if you are a loyal party group member. The dissenters are only allowed at night.’ Since there 
are no party political constraints for the usage of EoVs, it provides a channel to explain 
defection or communicate reservations despite voting along party line (Sieberer, 2015). 
Although its public visibility is relatively low, the usage of EoVs is a good measure of 
contestation within parliamentary party groups. 
 
2.1 Individual-level determinants of disunity in the context of party control 
The variety of control mechanisms and disciplinary measures do not affect legislators 
7 
equally. The threshold of communicating dissent is contingent upon the mandate, experience 
and rank of the individual MP, and personal characteristics such as gender could be relevant 
as well. 
The Bundestag employs a mixed-member proportional system, and existing studies 
(Sieberer, 2010; Manow, 2013; Ohmura, 2014; Degner and Leuffen, 2016) provide mixed 
results regarding the question whether behavioural differences exist between MPs elected 
from single-member districts and MPs elected via closed party lists. Studies that do find more 
rebellious behaviour among district MPs emphasise the explanatory power of the competition 
and strategy for re-election. If district MPs seek the personal vote (Gschwend and Zittel, 
2015), they are prone to engage in constituency service and ‘feel the need to differentiate 
themselves from their parliamentary party by taking positions countering party stands or even 
by voting against their party on issues that are salient to constituents (especially when 
government survival is not at stake)’ (André et al., 2014, pp. 87–88, emphasis added), and 
those issues are not necessarily local issues. The euro crisis has certainly become a prominent 
issue, and given that political parties are generally more pro-European than their voters 
(Mattila and Raunio, 2012), the question arises whether district MPs are more responsive to 
the electorate in EU affairs1. 
H1: District MPs are more likely to vote against party line and express discontent in 
EoVs, but we do not expect mandate type to matter for speech. 
In line with previous studies (e.g. Becher and Sieberer, 2008), we hypothesise that German 
legislators in executive, parliamentary or party office are less likely than backbenchers to 																																																								
1 The German Politikbarometer survey from September 2011 revealed that when asked which party best 
represents their interests in managing the euro crisis 14% of respondents said none and 28% were not able to 
answer the question (http://www.forschungsgruppe.de/Umfragen/Politbarometer/Archiv/Politbarometer_2011/ 
Oktober_II/, accessed 4 March 2017). 
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defect from party line or publicly disagree with the position of their party. Hence, they should 
be allowed to speak more often. 
H2: Voting defection is likely to be driven by backbenchers, while plenary debates tend 
to be dominated by frontbenchers. 
From the literature on parliamentary socialisation we know that ‘the ambition of newcomers 
to gain political influence and their lack of resources necessary to achieve this goal are the 
central incentives for these junior legislators to adapt to the internal rules and norms’ (Best 
and Vogel, 2014, p. 60). Thus, our expectation is that lack of experience, measured in years 
of membership in parliament, is correlated with conformist behaviour. 
H3a: Experienced MPs are more likely to express dissent in terms of voting behaviour, 
and EoVs could be a useful channel of communication for less experienced MPs who 
lack access to the plenary floor. 
Kam (2014, p. 404) suggests that ‘the most rebellious MPs are those who have been demoted 
from the front-bench (and who are unlikely therefore to be ministers again), or those who 
failed to secure a promotion early in their parliamentary careers (and who are likely therefore 
to languish on the backbenches throughout their careers)’. We therefore also test for a 
combined effect of experience and rank. 
H3b: Longer-serving MPs with a backbench position are more inclined to defect and 
less likely to speak. 
While the existing literature provides very little evidence of a gender effect with regards to 
party unity (see Cowley and Childs, 2003 for an exception), Bäck et al. (2014) find that 
gender could play a role in the allocation of floor time. Female underrepresentation is 
particularly pronounced in debates on ‘harder’ policy issues such as macroeconomics, 
transportation, finance and energy. Although the reasons for female underrepresentation in 
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specific policy areas are still subject to debate, we expect some gender-based division of 
labour in debates on the euro crisis, which despite its complexity can be considered 
predominantly a macroeconomic and fiscal issue. 
H4: Women MPs are less likely to give plenary speeches and EoVs and are possibly 
less inclined to defect. 
 
3. Data, variables and methods 
Between May 2010 and August 2015, the Bundestag passed 12 acts (see Table 1) on the euro 
crisis, out of which five concerned aid packages for Greece. The Greek crisis has been 
debated for more than ten hours in the plenary assembly, amounting to 74 speeches and 15 
interventions/questions. In total, MPs issued 410 EoVs regarding the euro crisis, out of which 
240 EoVs were in relation to RCVs on the Greek situation. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
We collected data of all activities related to the votes on the Greek crisis. The period of 
observation stretches across two legislative periods2, and our data set comprises of 881 MPs, 
out of which 394 of have actively participated in the debates. In total, we have 1240 
observations, that is, occasion where an individual legislator has delivered a plenary speech, 
cast a defecting vote or issued an EoV. All votes related to euro crisis measures were 
recorded, which in itself tells us something about their public visibility and the level of 
importance attached to them, since, historically, only around 5% of votes in the Bundestag 
have been recorded (Bergmann et al., 2016, p. 26). A RCV needs to be requested by one 
party group or a minimum of 5% of total MPs and are generally used to increase public 																																																								
2 As a result of the 2013 elections, the FDP dropped out of the Bundestag, and the SPD joined the CDU and 
CSU for a ‘grand coalition’ government under Angela Merkel. 
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attention for one’s own position, to reveal internal divisions within political opponents or as a 
strategic measure to close ranks and deter potential dissenters (ibid., p. 31). When measuring 
defection as a form of individual-level dissent, we also take into account abstentions, which 
in our case can be clearly distinguished from being absent. In fact, entire party groups 
occasionally choose to abstain. Hence, any vote that does not follow the party line is counted 
as deviant3. 
First, we sort our data in a long format so that every observation corresponds to a 
different parliamentary action relevant to the Greek crisis. We specify three Generalized 
Linear Latent and Mixed Models (GLLAMMs) with adaptive quadrature4, one for each type 
of individual-level activity. ‘To relax the assumption of conditional independence among the 
responses for the same [person]’ (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2012, p. 247), we include a 
two-level model with a random intercept for subjects – MPs of the 17th and 18th term. 
Our core independent variables are mandate, rank, experience and gender. Overall, 
48% of Bundestag MPs hold a district mandate, but there is a large variation across party 
groups5. Rank is a combination of four variables: an MP is considered a frontbencher if she 
was either a member of the government (Chancellor, Minister, Parliamentary secretary, 
Federal commissioner) or a member of the central party leadership (Party chair, Deputy party 
chair, General secretary, Treasurer, Member of executive board) or held a high-ranking 
position in the parliament (President, Vice President, Standing committee chair) or in the 
																																																								
3 The party line is defined as the position adopted by the leadership. In July 2015, when the Bundestag voted on 
the government’s mandate for negotiating the third aid package, the Greens did not have a whipped party line 
and this was reflected in very low voting unity. In this case, we could not count any votes as deviant to avoid 
skewed results. 
4 For a more detailed description, see Supplementary Material and Table S1. 
5 See Supplementary Table S2. 
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parliamentary group (Parliamentary group chair, Deputy parliamentary group chair, (First) 
parliamentary manager). Experience reflects the years served in Bundestag until the year that 
each parliamentary action took place. We grouped MPs into four categories: eight years and 
less, nine to 16 years, 17 to 24 years, and 25 years and more. In order to test the combined 
effect of rank and experience, we add the dummy variable ‘Backbencher_Experience>8’, 
where backbenchers are MPs with no position of responsibility and experience means 
membership in the Bundestag for at least two terms (i.e. more than eight years). We also look 
for gender effects, and our analysis controls for party and government coalition. 
 
4. Empirical results 
Before testing our hypotheses to enhance our understanding of individual-level determinants 
of intra-party disunity, we present some descriptive findings to contextualise intra-party 
contestation of the Greek crisis. 
 
4.1 Descriptive findings 
In line with our theoretical expectation (see Figure 1 above), participation differs by the type 
of activity6. We observe that intra-party disunity in the form of defection has gradually 
increased, highlighting that disunity is a dynamic phenomenon contingent not only upon 
actors, but also issues and timing. Table 2 also shows that the highest activity levels are to be 
found for the usage of EoVs, and unsurprisingly the share of MPs giving a speech remained 
consistently low, since in the plenum time is a very scarce and controlled resource. A partial 
explanation for the higher levels of activity in 2015 is the fact that the Bundestag had to 
																																																								
6 For variance between party groups, see Supplementary Table S3. 
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return twice from summer recession only to debate and vote on the Greek crisis. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
As illustrated in Figure 2, over the course of the crisis, all party groups have faced RCVs 
where their voting unity dropped well below average. When in 2015 the second aid package 
for Greece was extended and the third package was negotiated and passed, the disintegration 
of the consensus culminated in all parties with the exception of the Social Democrats (SPD), 
which became more united after joining the government in October 2013. We need to keep in 
mind that the government majority was much larger in the 18th term, which means that 
government parties could ‘afford’ more deviant votes. In empirical reality, however, 
Bergmann et al.’s (2016, p. 47) longitudinal study does not provide convincing evidence of a 
majority size effect on voting unity after 1990. 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
A growing number of EoVs were issued as well, indicating that German legislators felt a 
stronger need to communicate their views using the means available to them. We know from 
a recent study by Sieberer (2015, pp. 289–290) that ‘the usage of EoVs … constitutes non-
standard behaviour’: in the 16th term there were on average 3.1 EoVs by 12.4 individual 
signatories per RCV. Each single vote exceeded this average, and in February and July 2015 
even every fifth MP gave an individual EoV or signed a joint one7. Our analysis of 240 
written EoVs that 445 MPs delivered for the five voting sessions on the Greek crisis reveals 
that overall 45% of MPs use EoVs to express some doubts or differences of opinion despite 
voting with the party, another 22% explain defection and around one third support the party 
line in their statement8. Governing party MPs who give an EoV seem to be more prone to 
																																																								
7 For a visualisation, see Supplementary Figure S1. 
8 See Supplementary Table S4. 
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defect in a later vote. To give an example, almost every fourth of the 108 CDU/CDU MPs 
who issued a ‘support’ or ‘yes-but’ EoV in February 2015 voted against their own party later 
that year. In the next section, we test this sequential relationship between EoVs and voting 
defection more systematically using a time series regression model. 
 
4.2 Regression analyses 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Table 3 reveals that among our independent variables, only rank shows a statistically 
significant effect for all three types of individual-level activity (with the exception of 
defection in Model 2). Following intuitive logic and confirming our expectation that MPs in a 
high-ranking position are less likely to express grievances against the official party line 
(Hypothesis 2), backbenchers are unlikely to get floor time in these highly salient debates, 
whereas frontbenchers are less inclined to deliver an EoV or cast a deviant vote. 
Contrary to our expectation (Hypothesis 1) that district MPs may be more responsive to 
the electorate, which is very sceptical about financial assistance to Greece, mandate type does 
not seem to matter for voting behaviour. In fact, district MPs are also less inclined to explain 
their voting decision (cf. Zittel and Nyhuis, this issue), indicating that EoVs offer a channel 
of communication for MPs who find the threshold of defection too high or have more to lose, 
as list MPs are more dependent on their party leadership for re-election. 
Confirming Hypothesis 3a, conformist voting behaviour decreases with years of 
experience, but simultaneously the least experienced MPs make more use of EoVs. In debates 
that party leaders consider most important, newcomers lack access to the plenary floor, but 
given the salience and media attention of the votes on the Greek crisis, less experienced MPs 
are motivated to utilise other channels of communication such as EoVs. In Model 2 we test 
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the rebelliousness of experienced MPs with a backbench position (Hypothesis 3b). Indeed, in 
the case of defection, the independent effects found for rank and experience vanish, while the 
combined effect is very strong. 
Looking at gender effects, our evidence confirms that women MPs are 
underrepresented in plenary debates on the Greek crisis, which is in line with Bäck et al.’s 
findings and Hypothesis 4. On the other hand, compared to their male colleagues, female 
MPs show higher levels of activity with regards to EoVs. Considering the other findings 
regarding the usage of EoVs, this leads us to argue that when controversiality is rising, as was 
certainly the case with the Greek crisis, but this is not sufficiently reflected in the plenary 
debates, EoVs provide an ‘outlet’, that is, a worthwhile exercise to raise their voice, in 
particular for backbenchers, the least experienced MPs, list MPs and – in ‘hard’ policy issues 
like this one – also female MPs. The fact that EoVs are even used quite extensively to 
express support for the party position is a meaningful indicator of widespread intra-party 
contestation. 
Lastly, the party control variable reveals that members of the SPD, Left Party and 
Greens are less likely to cast a deviant vote and deliver an EoV than their CDU colleagues, 
which shows that increasing disunity was to a large extent driven by the Christian Democrats. 
As shown by Zittel and Nyhuis (this issue), this finding is contrary to the general tendencies 
in the Bundestag, as we would expect party unity to be highest in the CDU and CSU and 
lowest in the Green Party and SPD. We may thus wonder why there is a backbench rebellion 
on this issue among the Christian Democrats but not, for example, the other large centrist 
party, the Social Democrats. Considering that there are strong conservative forces within the 
CDU/CSU, this finding supports the claim of cleavage theory that conservative parties are 
most inclined to internal dissent on EU issues. 
The analysis presented above is static in the sense that it does not take into account 
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previous actions. Although there is a plethora of scholarly work on the positive impact of 
previous RCVs on current ones (e.g. Hirano, 2008; Degner and Leuffen, 2016), to the best of 
our knowledge, there are no empirical findings regarding legislative speech and EoVs. To test 
how previous actions affect legislative behaviour, we repeat the analysis (only for Model 19) 
adding the lagged value (L.) of the dependent variables10. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Comparing the results between Table 3 and 4, the first key observation is that rank maintains 
the same effect and its statistical significance for all three activities. Furthermore, we observe 
that defecting in one vote increases the odds of casting a deviant vote in the next vote by 
eleven times. It seems that dissenters, especially from the governing parties, have little 
incentive to change their voting behaviour once they have crossed the threshold of defection, 
given that the issue at hand has become more contested while the government’s official 
position on the Greek crisis remained largely unaltered. In the case of EoVs, we see an effect 
in the opposite direction: MPs are more likely to explain their voting decision if they have not 
done so in the previous debate. Apparently, an MP who delivered an EoV in the past does not 
have a strong motivation to explain her decision again if her opinion on the issue has 
remained unchanged. What is even more intriguing, our results (see Model B) show that an 
MP who explained her voting decision is two times more likely to defect in a future vote. In 																																																								
9 The results are more or less the same under Model 2 (available upon request), but since the variable 
‘Backbencher_Experience>8’ is not statistically significant under Model 2, we present only the results of Model 
1. 
10 Some scholars argue against the use of lagged dependent variables in a random effects model, since it usually 
suppresses the explanatory power of the other independent variables (Achen, 2001), but this is not an issue here, 
at least for the bulk of cases presented in Table 4. Also adding lagged dependent variables in our study is 
paramount as we are dealing with the same issue, the Greek crisis, in five episodes that are interrelated. 
Therefore, how MPs behaved at t-1 also affects how they behave at t. 
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other words, EoVs are a first step towards deviant voting and can function as a ‘warning’ 
mechanism for party leaderships. 
To sum up, our results highlight that a legislator’s rank within his party matters and that 
intra-party contestation on the Greek crisis was largely driven by backbenchers and by the 
Christian Democrats. Also the years of experience as an MP and even gender are relevant in 
explaining activity patterns in the Bundestag. On this particular issue, there is no conclusive 
evidence of a ‘mandate divide’. 
 
4. Conclusion 
When talking about the politicisation, meaning increasing contestation and domestication, of 
EU politics, we cannot simply assume that national legislatures would be a driving force, as 
these processes are both enabled and constrained by institutional conditions, which are to a 
large extent shaped by political parties. This study is premised on the argument that the 
German Bundestag is anything but an obvious case of EU contestation. Since the onset of the 
euro crisis at the latest, cracks emerged in the pro-EU cross-partisan consensus, and in line 
with earlier theoretical propositions dissent started to form within mainstream parties at least 
as much as between parties. As it is in the interest of the party leadership to maintain a 
cohesive party label and party discipline is generally strong in the Bundestag, we discuss the 
theoretical implications of party control and test how it affects individual-level activity and 
thus party (dis)unity around the Greek crisis, a contentious policy issue that has received 
more and more public attention over the years. 
Given the salience of the issue, party leaders exercise tight control of the Bundestag’s 
plenum, resulting in plenary debates dominated by party leaders themselves and other 
experienced frontbenchers, who toe the party line. The debates therefore did not adequately 
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reflect the increasing contentiousness of the Greek crisis, but the disintegration of the 
consensus within legislative parties, particularly the Christian Democrats, became evident in 
voting disunity and the extensive usage of EoVs. To the best of our knowledge, our analysis 
establishes for the first time a link between EoVs and deviant voting, as we show that MPs 
who justify their voting decision are more likely to vote against their party in a future vote. 
This finding emphasises the dynamic and sequential nature of party disunity. Especially in a 
legislature where party discipline and control are very high, voting dissent – although often 
the prime focus of the literature – is only the final (and most easily observed) stage. 
This article also stresses the value of in-depth case studies for the study of party unity, 
in that they enhance our understanding of the contextual determinants of party unity. In 
addition to, for instance, time factors and issue variance, we should closely examine actors 
within legislative parties. At the beginning of this article we ask whether backbenchers, who 
tend to be more critical of extending the EU’s competences any further, have learned to fight 
back and make their dissenting voices heard within parliament. Out of all individual-level 
variables, our results show the most consistent effect regarding MPs’ rank. Since the channel 
of legislative speech is often closed to them, it remains questionable though to what extent 
they can actually influence the public debate. The next logical step would be to analyse the 
impact of growing voting dissent and disagreement with the party line expressed in EoVs on 
the actual content of plenary debates. In other words, we need to ask how the absence of 
certain actors shapes the publicly visible debates, addressing the question why it matters who 
speaks for the party. 
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Table 1 Bundestag RCVs on euro crisis measures and aid packages 
Date Acts 
17th legislative term 
7 May 2010 First aid package for Greece 
21 May 2010 Creation of the EFSF 
29 September 2011 Expansion of the EFSF 
27 February 2012 Second aid package for Greece 
29 June 2012 Creation of the ESM 
19 July 2012 Rescue package for Spanish banks 
18 April 2013 Aid package for Cyprus 
 Aid package for Portugal 
 Aid package for Ireland 
18th legislative term 
27 February 2015 Extension of second aid package for Greece 
17 July 2015 Government mandate for negotiations with Greece on third aid package 
19 August 2015 Third aid package for Greece 
 
 
Table 2 Percentage of total MPs who participated by type of activity 
RCV  Speech  Defection  EoV 
Greece I  2.3  2.3  10.5 
EFSF  1.8  1.8  3.2 
EFSF expansion  2.3  2.9  12.6 
Greece II  2.1  4.7  11.8 
ESM  3.2  4.4  13.4 
Spain  2.9  8.1  3.9 
Cyprus, Portugal, Ireland  2.1  6.6  9.2 
Greece II extension  2.1  7.1  21.7 
Greece III negotiations  2.9  11.3  19.7 
Greece III  2.7  13.6  7.0 
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Table 3 OR estimates of two-level random intercept logistic 
  
Speech 
(95% CI)  
Defection 
(95% CI)  
EoV11 
(95% CI) 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 1 Model 2  Model 1 Model 2 
Rank: 
Backbencher  
.154** 
(.085) 
.031*** 
(.027)  
3.064** 
(1.204) 
1.049 
(.529)  
2.069*** 
(.326) 
1.918*** 
(.438) 
Mandate: 
Direct  
5.015** 
(3.093) 
5.297* 
(3.630)  
1.319 
(.454) 
1.302 
(.446)  
.728* 
(.115) 
.727* 
(.114) 
Experience: ≤8 
9–16 
 
17–24 
 
25+ 
 
 
 
2.163 
(1.253) 
3.631 
(2.645) 
4.664* 
(3.110) 
 
.713 
(.486) 
1.213 
(.967) 
1.534 
(1.395) 
 
 
2.012* 
(.667) 
1.719 
(.782) 
3.963* 
(2.441) 
 
.485 
(.291) 
.444 
(.300) 
1.072 
(.821) 
 
 
.655** 
(.096) 
.864 
(.153) 
.636 
(.211) 
 
.589 
(.163) 
.782 
(.230) 
.577 
(.220) 
Gender: 
Female  
.231* 
(.131) 
.225* 
(.135)  
.963 
(.307) 
.977 
(.317)  
1.452** 
(.171) 
1.457** 
(.172) 
Government 
coalition: Yes  
1.849 
(1.522) 
2.694 
(2.475)  
.247* 
(.150) 
.252* 
(.157)  
.555* 
(.133) 
.557* 
(.134) 
Party: CDU 
CSU 
 
SPD 
 
FDP 
 
Left Party 
 
Greens 
 
  
.382 
(.331) 
1.857 
(1.471) 
11.633** 
(9.553) 
5.446 
(6.906) 
13.610 
(18.583) 
 
.411 
(.359) 
2.108 
(1.675) 
13.864** 
(12.602) 
7.561 
(10.693) 
22.682* 
(34.909) 
  
1.899 
(.900) 
.100*** 
(.064) 
1.251 
(.894) 
.194* 
(.147) 
.027*** 
(.025) 
 
2.004 
(.964) 
.094*** 
(.062) 
1.194 
(.823) 
.179* 
(.140) 
.026*** 
(.024) 
  
1.111 
(.262) 
.599** 
(.111) 
1.453 
(.450) 
.430* 
(.141) 
.518* 
(.171) 
 
1.115 
(.263) 
.598** 
(.111) 
1.451 
(.448) 
.428** 
(.140) 
.519* 
(.171) 
Backbencher_
Experience>8   
11.386* 
(12.642)   
5.555* 
(3.777)   
1.141 
(.338) 
Condition 
number  18.667 20.311  18.954 19.180  15.244 15.496 
MP-level 
variance  
3.365 
(1.114) 
3.781 
(1.298)  
2.123 
(.671) 
2.230 
(.704)  
6.642e-24 
(4.110e-19) 
2.767e-25 
(1.013e-19) 
log likelihood  -180.866 -177.225  -414.990 -411.628  -756.167 -756.084 
N (level 1)  1240 1240  1240 1240  1240 1240 
N (level 2)  401 401  401 401  401 401 
Notes: Results are displayed in terms of odds ratio (OR); estimates have been computed 
using Stata programme: gllamm; robust standard errors given in parentheses; * p<.05; ** 
p<.01; *** p<.001. 
 																																																								
11 Since there are three types of EoV (support, yes-but and defect) that can be ordered, we also run two ordinal 
logit models, one for Model 1 and one for Model 2. Results were statistically significant only for two variables, 
government coalition and party, which is not surprising given the small N (=401). 
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Table 4 OR estimates of two-level random intercept logistic with lagged (L.) variables 
 Speech 
(95% CI) 
EoV 
(95% CI) 
Defection 
(95% CI) 
Model A 
Defection 
(95% CI) 
Model B 
L.Speech 3.009 (2.793) – – – 
L.Defection – – 11.359*** (3.472) – 
L.EoV – .617** (.114) – 
2.400** 
(.768) 
Rank: 
Backbencher 
.185* 
(.127) 
1.988** 
(.405) 
2.523** 
(.721) 
3.505** 
(1.492) 
Mandate: 
Direct 
3.642 
(2.901) 
.949 
(.222) 
.939 
(.277) 
1.173 
(.490) 
Experience: ≤8 
9–16 
 
17–24 
 
25+ 
 
 
3.530 
(2.759) 
6.504* 
(6.173) 
5.552 
(5.193) 
 
.594** 
(.111) 
.780 
(.169) 
.537 
(.200) 
 
1.213 
(.309) 
1.210 
(.385) 
1.251 
(.561) 
 
1.653 
(.656) 
1.285 
(.646) 
2.679 
(1.946) 
Gender: 
Female 
.212* 
(.151) 
1.499* 
(.255) 
.713 
(.189) 
.654 
(.261) 
Government 
coalition: Yes 
2.019 
(2.247) 
.242*** 
(.083) 
.205* 
(.154) 
.147* 
(.114) 
Party: CDU 
CSU 
 
SPD 
 
FDP 
 
Left Party 
 
Greens 
 
 
.405 
(.438) 
2.338 
(1.999) 
16.393* 
(22.359) 
6.046 
(10.560) 
17.422 
(32.223) 
 
1.091 
(.340) 
.984 
(.253) 
.477 
(.320) 
.386* 
(.180) 
.220** 
(.107) 
 
1.531 
(.490) 
.109** 
(.070) 
1.538 
(.881) 
.098** 
(.086) 
.005*** 
(.006) 
 
2.458 
(1.373) 
.078** 
(.061) 
1.329 
(1.159) 
.099* 
(.095) 
.002*** 
(.002) 
Condition 
number 
21.222 16.146 24.213 20.011 
MP-level 
variance 
4.087 
(2.901) 
6.084e-24 
(4.618e-18) 
3.897e-21 
(4.640e-17) 
2.975 
(1.277) 
log likelihood -123.768 -496.867 -278.890 -300.059 
N (level 1) 842 842 842 842 
N (level 2) 393 393 393 393 
Notes: Results are displayed in terms of odds ratio (OR); estimates have been computed 
using Stata programme: gllamm; robust standard errors given in parentheses; * p<.05; ** 
p<.01; *** p<.001. 
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Figure 1 Relationship between latent disagreement and observable disunity following 
Proksch and Slapin (2015a) (left); expected relationship between party control and intra-party 
disunity by type of activity (right) 
	
	
Figure 2 Agreement Index (Hix et al., 2003) for RCVs on euro crisis measures compared to 
average levels of the 17th term (Bergmann et al., 2016) by party group 
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	Supplementary material 
 
GLLAMM with adaptive quadrature 
GLLAMMs are ‘a class of multilevel latent variable models for (multivariate) responses of 
mixed type’ (Rabe-Hesketh et al., 2004, p. 7) including, among others, dichotomous 
categorical responses as it is the case here. As the GLLAMM is calculated using adaptive 
quadrature, its accuracy also depends on the number of integration points. Initially we run the 
model with quadrature points set at default (Q-default=8). We store the vector of parameter 
estimates and then pass them as starting values to the new model increasing the number of 
integration points to Q=12. We find that differences between the estimates of the two 
specifications are larger than 0.01%, which is usually the acceptable threshold. Increasing 
each time the number of integration points we notice that estimates are not affected by the 
choice of quadrature when Q=37. Although this number is four times larger than Q-default 
still all models converge very fast (it only takes four iterations for convergence). Following 
we keep the same number of integration points employing this time a model specification 
(xtlogit, re) that uses Gauss-Hermite quadrature (Liu and Pierce, 1994; Lessafre and 
Spiessens, 2001). Using the same rule of thumb, that is ‘if coefficients do not change by more 
than a relative difference of 10-4 (0.01%), the choice of quadrature points does not 
significantly affect the outcome’ (http://www.stata.com/manuals13/xtquadchk.pdf, accessed 
29 March 2017), we find that our model converges extremely well for the same number of 
quadrature points, that is Q=37. The reason that there is no difference found in the number of 
quadrature points between Gauss-Hermite quadrature and adaptive quadrature is probably 
due to the small cluster size. Results from the quadrature check between Q=37 and Q1=2×Q/3 
and Q2=4×Q/3 are given in Table S1 (Here we only show the results when the response 
	variable is speech). From Table A we see that the largest relative difference equals .00001, a 
number still smaller than the acceptable threshold. 
Supplementary Table S1 Quadrature comparison: Relative differences 
 Fitted quadrature  37 points 
Comparison 
quadrature 25 points 
--------------- 
Relative difference 
Comparison 
quadrature 49 points 
--------------- 
Relative difference 
log likelihood -180.86555 9.345e-09 -1.448e-10 
Rank 1.8730188 -1.694e-07 1.428e-09 
Mandate 1.6125319 4.606e-08 -4.074e-08 
Experience: 9–16 
Experience: 17–24 
Experience 25+ 
.77168358 
1.2896252 
1.5397672 
1.054e-06 
6.070e-07 
5.337e-07 
-1.692e-07 
-9.514e-08 
-6.643e-08 
Gender -1.465081 5.096e-08 -4.245e-08 
Government coalition .61457259 -1.552e-07 2.385e-08   
Party: CDU/CSU 
Party: SPD 
Party: FDP 
Party: Left 
Party: Greens 
-.96254669 
.61890103 
2.4538516 
1.6949131 
2.610784 
3.786e-07 
3.956e-07 
3.671e-07 
3.872e-07 
2.521e-07 
-3.401e-08 
-8.980e-08 
-9.615e-08 
-1.073e-07 
-5.659e-08 
Constant -7.5883448 1.338e-07 -4.162e-08 
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	Supplementary Table S2 Count and percentage of district and list MPs by party group 
Legislative 
term 
CDU/CSU SPD FDP Left Greens Total 
District List District List District List District List District List District List 
N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
17th term 218 91.2 21 8.8 64 43.8 82 56.2 0 0.0 93 100.0 16 21.1 60 78.9 1 1.5 67 98.5 299 48.1 323 51.9 
18th term 236 75.9 75 24.1 58 30.1 135 69.9 – – – – 4 6.3 60 93.8 1 1.6 62 98.4 299 47.4 332 52.6 
 
Supplementary Table S3 Percentage of MPs who became active, including (Act1) and excluding (Act2) the usage of joint EoVs, by party 
RCV on 
Greece 
CDU  CSU  SPD  FDP  Left  Greens  Total 
Act1 
(%) 
Act2 
(%) 
 Act1 
(%) 
Act2 
(%) 
 Act1 
(%) 
Act2 
(%) 
 Act1 
(%) 
Act2 
(%) 
 Act1 
(%) 
Act2 
(%) 
 Act1 
(%) 
Act2 
(%) 
 Act1 
(%) 
Act2 
(%) 
07.05.2010 7.7 7.7  15.6 11.1  5.5 5.5  18.3 18.3  2.6 2.6  52.9 10.3  13.7 8.7 
27.02.2012 7.8 7.8  15.9 15.9  33.6 8.9  9.7 9.7  28.9 25.0  11.8 2.9  17.7 10.5 
27.02.2015 47.1 19.2  41.1 33.9  1.6 1.6  – –  29.7 29.7  7.9 4.8  26.9 14.7 
17.07.2015 27.2 26.8  37.5 35.7  21.8 11.9  – –  17.2 12.5  54.0 20.6  28.1 21.0 
19.08.2015 23.9 23.9  30.4 30.4  6.2 6.2  – –  18.8 15.6  20.6 20.6  18.2 17.9 
 
	 
Supplementary Figure S1 Number of EoVs and EoV signatories for RCVs on euro crisis 
measures and aid packages 		
Supplementary Table S4 Amount of EoVs by type for RCVs on Greek aid packages 
Roll-call vote EoV type  Support Yes-but Defect Total 
Greece I 
adoption 
Individual  8 17 10 35 
Joint EoVs 0 3 1 4 MPs 0 31 3 34 
Greece II 
adoption 
Individual  15 2 7 24 
Joint EoVs 3 1 2 6 MPs 39 6 4 49 
Greece II 
extension 
Individual  22 15 14 51 
Joint EoVs 1 6 2 9 MPs 2 76 8 86 
Greece III 
negotiations 
Individual  22 27 26 75 
Joint EoVs 3 3 0 6 MPs 28 21 0 49 
Greece III 
adoption 
Individual  8 7 12 27 
Joint EoVs 1 0 2 3 MPs 2 0 13 15 
Total (EoVs) 83 81 76 240 
% 34.6 33.7 31.7 100.0 
Total (MPs) 146 202 97 445 
% 32.8 45.4 21.8 100.0 
